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INFORMED CONSENT TO ORGANIC BEHAVIOR
CONTROL
Brent A. Barnhart,* Michael Lee Pinkerton** and
Robert T. Roth***
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self protection. . . .His own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because
it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would
be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading
him or entreatinghim, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with an evil in case he do otherwise. To justify
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him
must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. John
Stuart Mill-18591
INTRODUCTION

Absent a clear emergency, any medical treatment imposed
without the consent of the subject is considered to be unlawful.
In spite of this generally accepted precept, the law continues
to employ standards of consent which frequently deny persons
labelled "mentally ill" control over the use of organic behavior
control procedures.2
* Legislative Representative and Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union
of Northern California, Sacramento, California; A.B., 1965, University of California,
Riverside; J.D., 1969, Indiana University, Bloomington; member, state bars of California and Indiana.
** B.A., 1973, University of Colorado; J.D., 1976, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law; member, state bar of California.
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Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, San Francisco, California.
1. ON LIBERTY 68 (Pelican ed. 1974).
2. For a brief discussion of the development of the modern concept of informed
consent see Comment, Informed Consent and the Mental Patient: CaliforniaRecognizes a Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Psychosurgery and Shock Treatment, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 725, 730 n.34 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Informed
Consent]; see also note 49 and accompanying text infra.
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In this article we explore the constitutional and common
law tort foundations of consent to organic procedures3 which
are designed to alter or control mentation and/or behavior.'
Our thesis is twofold: first, a condition precedent to the use of
such procedures must be the consent of the person upon whom
the procedures are imposed; second, such consent should be
defined in factual terms susceptible of empirical analysis. We
believe that in determining whether consent is present, legislatures and courts should not impose procedures which evaluate
whether such consent is intelligently or rationally exercised.
Currently, the accepted definition of informed consent to
treatment is comprised of three elements: (1) knowledge-the
adequacy of the information conveyed to the prospective treatment subject and his or her comprehension of this information;
(2) volition-the circumstances allowing for freedom of choice;
and (3) competency-the capacity to make rational or intelligent judgments.'
Consent to organic behavior control procedures, in our
view, should be redefined entirely in terms of knowledge and
volition; the competency element should be eliminated. We are
persuaded that this third element is a value-laden concept
which permits the negation of an individual's informed and
voluntary choice on the basis of criteria not subject to factual
analysis.
For purposes of illustration, we will focus our attention on
convulsive and psychosurgical procedures, two of the most extreme and intrusive forms of organic behavior and mentation
control. We consider these procedures to be the most drastic;
their utilization presents demonstrably radical and permanent
Organic therapy is defined as those treatment modalities which affect
or alter through electrochemical or surgical means a person's thought
patterns, sensations, feelings, perceptions, and mentation . . . or mental
activity generally; or conditioning techniques using the effects of electrical or chemical intervention into mental functioning as part of the conditioning program . . . . [Tihe expression also includes conditioning
using the infliction of severe physical pain . . . . Nonorganic modalities
of therapy include a wide variety of techniques described by a plethora
of terms, the most inclusive of which is probably "psychotherapy."
Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use
of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 244 n.S (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Shapiro].
4. "Mentation refers to cognition, understanding, perception, emotion-loosely,
any mental functioning or activity." Id. at 246 n.14.
5. The terms "competency" and "capacity" are used interchangeably in this
context by courts and commentators, and in this article.
3.
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alterations of mentation, resulting in serious effects to the subject. Parenthetically, it is suggested that our legal analysis applies with equal validity to all organic procedures for the alteration of mentation or behavior. The effects of various psychoactive drugs, for example, range in intensity from rather mild
changes of immediate behavior to dramatic alterations of both
mentation and behavior. In our view, the very imposition of
such procedures in the absence of informed voluntary consent
is an abuse.'
Our attempt to redefine the concept of legally valid consent in this context begins with a discussion of the concept of
"mental illness"; that discussion gives rise to the competency
issue. We then review the constitutional and tort bases for a
consent requirement prior to the imposition of organic procedures. Our subsequent analysis of the effects of convulsive and
psychosurgical procedures emphasizes their inherently experimental nature. We discuss how recent legislation, case authority and legal scholarship deal with consent, contrasting these
concepts with our premise that informed consent should
consist solely of knowledge and volition. We conclude with a
legislative model consistent with our position.
In the absence of a clear life-threatening emergency situation, any medical procedures without the consent of the subject
are unlawful. Yet the law presently persists in employing standards of consent which frequently deny persons adjudicated, or
otherwise labelled mentally ill, appropriate control over the
imposition of organic procedures to which they may be subjected.
The cost of such an anachronism in human terms is substantial. Many persons deemed not competent to give or refuse
consent to organic procedures have been victims of considerable suffering, permanent brain damage, and in some cases,
death. Furthermore, the special status of such persons as allegedly incompetent has deprived many of compensation for their
injuries.7
6. See Bomstein, The ForcibleAdministrationof Drugs to Prisonersand Mental
Patients, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 379 (1975); Comment, Forced Drug Medication of
Involuntarily Committed Mental Patients, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 100 (1975); Note,
Mental Health-The Right to Refuse Drug Therapy Under "Emergency Restraint
Statutes," 11 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 509 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957) (legally
competent patient was not awarded damages although he claimed that his consent to
electroshock treatment was based on inadequate knowledge. His wife's consent, however, was adequate. In the judgment of the patient's wife and psychiatrist, it was
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Our argument, in summary, is as follows: considering, (1)
disagreement within the scientific community conbasic
the
cerning the concepts of "incompetence" and "mental illness";
(2) the strong conviction in the inviolability of the individual
which pervades our constitutional framework; (3) the structure
of tort law which holds medical procedures performed without
the consent of the subject to be actionable at law; and (4) the
experimental, unpredictable and often irreversible nature of
psychosurgical and convulsive procedures, it is anachronistic
and unconscionable to deprive persons, upon whom "mentalpatient" status has been imposed, of any meaningful role in
decisions concerning their prospective submission to procedures that may result, and are intended to result, in actual and
fundamental alteration of the subject's mental state.
EFFICACY OF A CORE CONCEPT: "MENTAL ILLNESS"

The concept of "mental illness" is a theoretical construct
subject to substantial professional dispute. Nevertheless, the
notion of mental illness has been used to justify courses of
action whereby the liberty of a person so labeled is restricted,
and his or her mentation altered, without personal informed
consent. Given the fundamental nature of the individual rights
involved, it is imperative that legislative and judicial schemes
not be formulated upon an uncritical belief that the concept of
''mental illness" has a fixed meaning.
The legal literature is only beginning to reflect the considerable and growing conflict over the meaning of "mental illness" within the social-scientific and psychiatric disciplines. It
is crucial that lawyers, legislators, and the courts grasp the
depth and extent of that controversy.
The divergent views stem primarily from a basic difference
in theoretical orientation within the mental health disciplines.'
To avoid confusion and to standardize the vocabulary in this
article, we will characterize these theoretical schools as
thought "unwise" to require the patient to consider the hazards entailed); Farber v.
Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953) (where hip fractures resulting in permanent
deformity sustained by adult incompetent during electroshock treatment held not to
be actionable, absent a showing of negligence, where the patient's parent had authority
to consent and had consented); Wilson v. Lehman, 379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964)
(where consent to electroshock therapy which resulted in injury was presumed from
the fact that treatment had taken place at all).
8. The term "mental health disciplines" includes the fields of psychiatry, psychology, social psychology, psychiatric social work, and related disciplines.
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positivistic9 and phenomenological.I"In so doing we are aware
that this classification is very general, and that within each of
these two categories there are several subclassifications which
may have little in common with each other beyond a basic
orientation."
The positivistic school utilizes the natural science model
for its theoretical underpinnings. The psychiatrist nominally
adopts an "objective" or "value-free" stance toward the subject matter and proceeds from that Archimedian point. The
British psychiatrist, Dr. Ronald Laing, has critically described
the positivist school in this manner:
[It is] based on attempts of nineteenth century psychiatrists to bring the frame of clinical medicine to bear on
their observations. Thus the subject matter of psychiatry
was thought of as mental illness; one thought of mental
physiology and mental pathology, one looked for signs and
symptoms, made one's diagnosis, assessed prognosis and
prescribed treatment. According to one's philosophical
bias, one looked for the etiology of these mental illnesses
in the mind, in the body, in the environment, or in inherited propensities.' 2
The positivist school, then, regards mental illness as an
objectively real, diagnosable, and treatable phenomenon. However, within the positivist school itself, there is considerable
controversy over the classification and diagnosis of the various
types of putative mental illness. While positivist clinicians
may be in substantial agreement when diagnosing into very
broad categories such as "psychosis" or "neurosis," the general
consensus breaks down when more specific classification is at3
tempted.
9.

The philosophical formulation of positivism is contained in L. WITrOENSTEIN,

TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

chiatry text is L. KoLB,
10.

(1922). An example of a standard positivistic psy(8th ed. 1973).

MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY

The "founding father" of phenomenology is E. Husserl. A good introduction

to his writings is PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF PHILOSOPHY (1965). An excellent
secondary source is Q. LAUER, PHENOMENOLOGY: ITS GENESIS AND PROSPECT (1965). For
a psychiatrist's formulation see L. BINSWANGER, BEING-IN-THE-WORLD (1973).
11.

S. Lyman and M. Scott have illustrated this theoretical split in sociology and

social psychology in the introduction to A SOCIOLOGY OF THE ABSURD (1970).
12. R. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 102-03 (Ballantine ed. 1967) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as LAING].
13. Some argue that the degree of agreement among clinicians is not even this
great. The leading study on this topic is Ash, The Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnoses,
44 J. ABNORM. Soc. PSYCHOL. 272 (1949). This and other studies are collected and
analyzed in Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
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The phenomenological school rejects the objectivist natural science model in favor of one that is self-reflective and
cognizant of its implicit value assumptions. From this viewpoint psychiatrists become aware of the socio-historical relativity of the concept of "mental illness."' 4 While acknowledging
that individuals may experience difficulties in living that at
times may be quite severe, the phenomenologists generally refuse to regard this phenomenon as an illness in the medical
sense. Dr. Thomas Szasz, a professor of psychiatry, has
maintained: "Of course, mental illness is not a thing or physical object; hence it can exist only in the same sort of way as
do other theoretical concepts. Yet, to those who believe in
them, familiar theories are likely to appear, sooner or later, as
'objective truths' or 'facts.' "5 "The expression 'mental illness'
is a metaphor that we have come to mistake for a fact."' 6
From the phenomenological view, there is much concern
over the legal and social implications of being adjudicated, or
otherwise labeled, "mentally ill." What the positivist would
refer to as a diagnosis is to the phenomenologist a political
labeling process through which deviant members of society are
identified and a particular method of dealing with the labelee
is justified.' 7
For the purpose of this article it is not essential to determine which of these views is more scientifically and philosophically sound.' 8 The crucial factor is the existence of this essential
divergence of views within the scientific community and the
danger of building legal conceptualizations on a factual frameCoins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974). See also Roth, Dayley & Lerner,
Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13
SANTA CLARA LAW. 400 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Roth et an].
14. See M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE
AGE OF REASON (1965).
15. T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY 12 (Anchor ed. 1970).
16. Id. at 23.
17. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 112-15
(Anchor ed. 1967); LAINO, supra note 12, at 120-21.
18. Terminology is a problem inherent in a comprehensive and critical review of
the coercive imposition of mental patient status; the construction of a new terminology
is a complex task beyond the scope of this article. We have adopted terms such as
"persons labeled mentally ill" or "inmates" depending on the context: the latter highlights the mental illness label in terms of detention and related side effects such as
stigmatization. Our attempt to avoid terminology endorsing the positivist school does
not imply acceptance of the phenomonological stance; we merely wish to restrict ourselves to terminology which reflects the empirical data. While reasonable persons may
differ as to whether a person is mentally ill or even as to whether such a concept has
any factual referent, the labeling process itself, apart from the issue of its alleged
validity, is an empirical fact.
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work whose legitimacy is stiffly debated by the very disciplines
which developed the framework. As Chief Justice (then Judge)
Burger, concurring in Blocker v. United States, observed:
[N]o rule of law can possibly be sound or workable which
is dependent upon the terms of another discipline whose
members are in profound disagreement about what those
terms mean. . . . This is not simply a matter of experts
disagreeing on opinions or on diagnosis, which often occurs, but disagreement at the threshold on what their own
9
critical terms mean.1

The actions of the state within the context of governmentrun mental institutions and prisons raises serious constitutional questions when organic behavior control procedures are
administered without the consent of the inmate.'" The legal
questions engendered by the role of the law in this area, however, transcend state action and focus on a more fundamental
issue. The acceptance of medical diagnoses and attachment of
legal consequences to them' has resulted in an off-hand disfranchisement (and in ancient terms, outlawing) of a group of
citizens who have committed no crimes.
The traditional legal attitude toward this issue has been
that the treatment and confinement of persons labeled mentally ill is within the discretion of the medical profession and
does not raise significant legal issues.22 The Supreme Court has
now clearly said that a finding of "mental illness" alone does
not constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physi19. 288 F.2d 835, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
20. See, e.g., Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (state violated a
prisoner's civil rights when it gave him a "fright drug" without obtaining his consent).
21. Although some effort is made to keep the concepts of mental illness and
competency separate, they are inextricably bound, the former serving as the basis of
the latter. For example, expert psychiatric testimony is deemed to have probative
value on the issue of legal responsibility for one's acts. Furthermore, FED. R. EVID. 704
allows a psychiatrist to testify as an expert on the ultimate issue of legal responsibility.
22. Petitioner in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 n.10 (1975) presented
such an argument which was rejected by the Court:
O'Connor argues that, despite the jury's verdict, the Court must
assume that Donaldson was receiving treatment sufficient to justify his
confinement, because the adequacy of treatment is a "nonjusticiable"
question that must be left to the discretion of the psychiatric profession.
That argument is unpersuasive. Where "treatment" is the sole asserted
ground for depriving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable to
suggest that the courts are powerless to determine whether the asserted
ground is present.
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cal liberty.23 A number of state 4 and lower federal25 courts have
come to similar conclusions. Since these developments in the
law are relatively recent and leave large areas of concern undiscussed, an examination of the law, its underlying assumptions,
and applicability of established doctrines to the specific area
of organic behavior control and informed consent to treatment
is both appropriate and necessary.
LEGAL BASES FOR PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF MENTATION

Having briefly explored the essential split within the scientific community over the notion of mental illness, we turn
now to the legal bases for protecting mentation. There are at
least two independently developed channels of legal thought
which support recognition of the protection of an individual's
mentation from intrusion by others: constitutional law and tort
law.
The ConstitutionalBasis
The sanctity of the individual and of his or her mentation
lies at the very center of the rights protected by the United
States Constitution. The first amendment-embodying multiple aspects of freedom of thought and expression-has been
pinpointed by Professor Shapiro as the essential constitutional
premise from which freedom of the individual's mental processes achieves recognition as a fundamental right.2 6 Shapiro
develops the following argument:
(1) The first amendment protects communications of virtually all kinds, whether in written, verbal, pictorial or any
symbolic form, and whether cognitive or emotive in nature.
(2) Communication entails the transmission and reception of whatever is communicated.
(3) Transmission and reception necessarily involve mentation on the part of both the person transmitting and the
person receiving.
23. Id. at 575. See also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1971);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1971).
24. See, e.g., People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 388, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509
(1975); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne
County, Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), excerpted in 2 PRISON L. RPrR. 433 (1973).
25. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
26. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 255-57.
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(4) It is in fact impossible to distinguish in advance mentation which will be involved in or necessary to transmission and reception from mentation which will not.
(5) If communication is to be protected, all mentation
(regardless of its potential involvement in transmission or
reception) must therefore be protected ...
(6) Organic therapy intrusively alters or interferes with
mentation.
(7) The first amendment therefore protects persons
against enforced alteration or interference with their mentation by coerced organic therapy.27
This constitutional basis was also articulated in a landmark ruling which declared that involuntarily confined persons
could not be used for experimental psychosurgery, Kaimowitz
v. Department of Mental Health.2 The Kaimowitz court said:
To the extent that the First Amendment protects the dissemination of ideas and the expression of thoughts, it
equally must protect the individual's right to generate
ideas.
As Justice Cardozo pointed out:
"We are free only if we know, and so in proportion to
our knowledge. There is no freedom without choice, and
there is no choice without knowledge,-or none that is
[not] illusory. Implicit, therefore, in the very notion of
liberty is the liberty of the mind to absorb and to beget,

For, if the First Amendment protects the freedom to
express ideas, it necessarily follows that it must protect the
freedom to generate ideas. Without the latter protection,
the former is meaningless.2
In our view, however, although the first amendment is
clearly an important basis from which freedom of mentation
can be inferred to be a fundamental right,3" it is not the sole
27. Id.
28. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), excerpted in 2
PRISON L. RPrR. 443 (1973).
29. Id. at 477-78 (emphasis added).
30. It should be noted parenthetically that courts have also recognized that
mental patients are entitled to protection from forced treatment where to compel

submission to such treatment would violate the freedom of religion. Thus, the Second
Circuit held in Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), that it was a violation of
the free exercise clause of the first amendment to compel submission to psychochemotherapy over the religious objections of an involuntarily confined, not legally incompetent, mental patient.
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basis.3 ' Nor would we argue that the freedom of mentation is
merely one of the penumbral or peripheral rights of the first
amendment. On the contrary, the fundamental right of freedom of mentation forms a portion of the first amendment's
nucleus.3 This nucleus constitutes a common thread running
through several of those rights declared to be fundamental.
That thread-or common denominator-is the central notion
that the individual is inviolable. That central notion of the
inviolability of the individual has seen development in multiple doctrines protecting the fundamental and personal rights
of individuals outside that of the first amendment: the fourth
amendment's proscription against unlawful search and seizure;
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination; the
recently developed right of privacy; 3 and the more recent unregardderscoring of the ultimate freedom of individual choice
34
ing decisions which affect one's fate before the law.
As articulated by the Court in Katz v. United States,"3 the
focus of the fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is a concern for the individual.
Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart said: "[T]he
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. .

.

. [What a

person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 36
As early as 1886, in days when the Court ostensibly was
less zealous in protecting personal rights, it underscored violation of the fourth and fifth amendments as invading the sanct31. See N. KirTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 388-94 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as KITTRIEJ. Shapiro also recognizes that the first amendment is not the sole basis for
this right; for his discussion on "mental privacy" based on the right to privacy see
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 273-76.
32. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965), Mr. Justice Douglas
characterized freedom of thought as a peripheral right emanating from the first amendment's penumbra. We do not disagree with Justice Douglas; however, as we conceive
the freedom of mentation to be at the core of several rights, a nuclear concept is more
accurate.
33. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas criminal abortion laws
violate the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her
pregnancy); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1968) (right to receive information and
ideas and to be free of governmental intrusions into one's privacy and control of one's
thoughts is constitutionally protected); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right to marital
privacy).
34. Farett& v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). (Sixth amendment guarantees
that a state criminal defendant has the right to defend himself without counsel when
he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so).
35. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
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ity of the individual:37 "It is not the breaking of his doors, and
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of
the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property
''38

The culmination of the Supreme Court's concern for the
sanctity of the individual has been its recent recognition and
development of an independent fundamental "right of
privacy" not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. The
right of privacy draws on several constitutional provisions
which specifically recognize the inviolability of the individual
as constitutionally protected.
In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,3" Mr.
Justice Brandeis gave the Court's first utterance of a right to
privacy, citing the fourth amendment's right against unreasonable search and seizure and the fifth amendment's right
against self-incrimination:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as againstthe Government, the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized man. 0
But not until Griswold v. Connecticut" in 1965 did the
Supreme Court adopt a fundamental right of privacy as the
constitutional basis for deciding an issue before the Court. In
Griswold, Mr. Justice Douglas referred not only to the first,
fourth and fifth amendments, but also to the third amendment's proscription against quartering soldiers "in any house"
in time of peace without consent of the owner.4" And in a concurring opinion in Griswold, Mr. Justice Goldberg relied on the
ninth amendment's reservation of "non-enumerated" rights to
37.

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, (1886); see also McNeil v. Director,

Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 252 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
38.
39.

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
277 U.S. 438 (1927).

40. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
41.
42.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484.
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the people as supportive of the right to privacy.43
Thus, the right of privacy now recognized by the United
States Supreme Court reflects a recognition of a notion common to several provisions of the Bill of Rights, but philosophically more basic than those rights. In our view, the search must
go even further. There is a need to look beyond the right of
privacy to a nucleus which joins not only the right of privacy
and the first amendment, but all situations in which the
Court's disposition reflects its response to unjustifiable invasions of the individual."
In California, what is nationally an implicit right of privacy became express when that right was added, by voter initiative, to the "inalienable rights" enumerated in the state constitution." The broad interpretation of that new constitutional
provision by the California Supreme Court46 strongly suggests
that freedom of mentation-one's very personality and autonomy-is even more basic than the right to privacy. As the
California Supreme Court declared in White v. Davis, affirming the concept articulated by Justice Brandeis: "The right of
privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and
compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our
thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our
freedom of communion and our freedom to associate with the
people we choose." 47 Underlying the "right to be left alone" is
a right to think in a certain fashion and a right to be a certain
person. More fundamental than the right to be left alone is the
right to remain as one is. It is not the irritation and threat of
external manipulation of one's personal life, but the external
43. Id. at 487-96.
44. See, e.g., the Court's expressed disfavor for unwarranted intrusion into
human bodies: Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Huguez v. United
States, 406 F.2d 366, 382 n.84 (9th Cir. 1968); and the Court's support of the freedom
of individuals to make decisions which affect their ultimate fortune in court proceedings: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
45. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1: "All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy."
46. See, e.g., Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1976); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1975).
47. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105 (1975) (citing a
statement drafted by proponents of the referendum to change the wording of CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 1) (emphasis added).
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compulsion to change one's personality that constitutes the
ultimate invasion of one's freedom.
To date, however, constitutional protection of the individual's freedom of mentation remains unarticulated. Whether we
proceed from the first amendment, the right of privacy, or any
other well-recognized constitutional doctrine,4" it is incumbent
upon the legal community to recognize the common denominator of the inviolability of the individual. The recognition of a
constitutional freedom of mentation would bring into focus the
fundamentalness of rights breached by unconsented organic
behavior control and the incongruity of the failure of the law
to assert its protection over the most basic of individual rights.
The Tort Basis
The individual's right to protection of his or her autonomy-his or her processes of mentation-from instrusion by
others also draws strong support from traditional tort law.
There exists a well-articulated body of law dealing with unlawfulness of medical treatment performed without the informed
consent of the patient.4"
For example, in a very thorough explanation of the informed consent doctrine, the California Supreme Court in
Cobbs v. Grant carefully explained the clear line which separates the authority and expertise of the physician from the
patient's ultimate decision to accept treatment:
Unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable
with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate
informed decision regarding the course of treatment to
which he knowledgeably consents to be subjected.
A medical doctor, being the expert, appreciates the
risks inherent in the procedure he is prescribing, the risks
of a decision not to undergo the treatment, and the probability of a successful outcome of the treatment. But once
this information has been disclosed, that aspect of the doctor's expert function has been performed. The weighing of
these risks against the individual subjective fears and
hopes of the patient is not an expert skill. Such evaluation
48. KITRIE, supra note 31, at 388-94.
49. Traditionally medical treatment performed without consent of the subject
has been regarded as a battery. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 165 (4th ed.
1971). For a discussion of modern concepts see authorities cited in Annas & Glantz,
Psychosurgery: The Law's Response, 54 BOSTON U.L. REV. 254-55 n.31 (1974); Waltz
& Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 n.1 (1970).
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and decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the
patient alone. ' "
The same concept is embodied in Harper and James' treatise on tort law:
The very foundation of the doctrine [of informed consent]
is every man's right to forego treatment or even cure if it
entails what for him are intolerable consequences or risks,
however warped or perverted his sense of values may be in
the eyes of the medical profession, or even of the community, so long as any distortion falls short of what the law
regards as incompetency. Individual freedom here is guaranteed only if people are given the right to make choices
which would generally be regarded as foolish.5'
Thus, the substantiality of the individual's right at common law to be free of intrusions affecting his or her physical
body and personal integrity is clear. It follows that this right
should also protect, without restriction and without qualification, the very core of the individual-one's mind and personality. As two commentators noted,
Anglo-Saxon law does not recognize-that is to say, it entirely disallows-nonconsensual treatment .

. .

. In other

words, unconsented surgery is, in the eyes of the law, tantamount to attack with a knife. There is no reason, from a
legal point of view, to regard unconsented psychiatric interventions-whether they consist of lobotomy, electroshock, hospitalization, or psychotherapy-in a different
light."
Yet, as we shall discuss, by means of a curious blend of
Catch-22 and well-meaning paternalism, such tort law protection is substantially without effect when the focus of the "treatment" is one's mind and personality.
DEVELOPING AREAS: INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT AND THE RIGHT

TO REFUSE PSYCHIATRIC PROCEDURES
Although the law has begun to move toward a reappraisal
of mental patient status and the implications of the labeling
process by which it is imposed, progress thus far has been halt50.

8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972).
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (1968 Supp.).
52. Alexander & Szasz, From Contract to Status via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA
LAW. 537, 548 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Alexander & Szasz].

51.
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ing; while moving with determination in one area, the law has
neglected essential rights in others.
In the area of involuntary confinement, courts and legislatures53 have begun to scrutinize previously unquestioned doctrines that all too often have been used as tools for shelving the
constitutional and other legal rights of persons labeled mentally ill.54 Recently, the Supreme Court in O'Conner v.
Donaldson held that a "finding of 'mental illness' alone" does
not constitutionally justify involuntary confinement. 5 In
1967, California nominally abolished indefinite involuntary
confinement. 5 For all such advances, however, and despite a
significant reduction in the number of persons involuntarily
confined in California's mental institutions, people are still
detained involuntarily even in the absence of a finding that
they are dangerous to self or others. Through the use of the
conservatorship mechanism and back-to-back commitments-what has been called a "revolving door" phenomenon-the number of persons involuntarily detained as mental
patients who pose no threat to society remains substantial."
Emerging from the concern for the rights of persons involuntarily confined is the infant doctrine of the "right to treatment." The courts have declared that persons have a right to
treatment if involuntarily confined, and if no treatment is pro53. For a discussion of statutes dealing with the involuntary confinement of
persons labeled mentally ill see Roth et at., supra note 13, at 412-16.
54. See notes 24 and 25 supra.
55. 422 U.S. 563, 575. The court noted,
[a] finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking a
person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. Assuming that the term can be given a reasonably
precise content and that the "mentally ill" can be identified with reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for confining such
persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely
in freedom.
Id. at 575.
56. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325 et seq. (West Supp. 1976). The LantermanPetris-Short Act further provides that the confined person is entitled to certain specific
rights, including the right to refuse convulsive procedures and psychosurgery. See also
E. BARDACH, THE SKILL FACTOR IN POLITICS: REPEALING THE MENTAL COMMITMENT LAWS
IN CALIFORNIA (1972); CAL. LEGISLATURE, ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
SUBCOMM.

CALIFORNIA

ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN

(1972).

57. Coleman, Lerner, Schwartz & Roth, Proposalfor a Task Force on the Civil
Rights of Mental Patients(1975). This report, submitted to the California Department
of Health, is based on the experience of three attorneys and a psychiatrist. The authors
cited apparently extensive violations of the law and recommended further investigation [on file with the Center for the Study of Legal Authority and Mental Patient
Status, Hartford, Conn.].
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vided, they must be released." s Whatever the benevolent intent
of the "right to treatment" doctrine, this concept could ultimately cause problems. It is presently accepted that once a
person is declared incompetent or incapacitated, his or her
informed consent to treatment is no longer possible. What is
generally not considered is that there may be no benefit conferred on a recipient who does not desire such treatment. 5 Furthermore, a number of treatment modalities involve secondary
or even primary deleterious effects. Thus, while the allegedly
incompetent person is deemed to have a right to treatment, the
critical concept of the right to refuse psychiatricprocedureshas
received wholly inadequate attention. 0
The inherent danger in the "right to treatment" doctrine
is that it can be turned into a license to administer psychiatric
procedures without informed consent. For example, one physician has argued that,
Legal restrictions on or prohibition of a medical or surgical
procedure may accomplish the goal of protecting some of
the human rights of patients. But, it also can deny some
58. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (based on local statutes);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (N.D. Ala. 1971). See Birnbaum, The Right to
Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960) (first enunciation of the argument that persons
involuntarily committed to mental institutions have the right to treatment-that an
institution either has to provide adequate treatment or release the patient, since confinement without meeting its purpose, whether medical, corrective or rehabilitational,
constitutes deprivation of liberty without due process of law); Editorial, A New Right,
46 A.B.A.J. 516 (1960); Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 936 (1974), and cases cited therein. See generally Hearings
on S. 935
Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Hearingson the ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Ill
Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
See also Ladimer, Rational Psychopharmacotherapyand Judicial Interpretations

of the Right to Treatment: An Outline, in

RATIONAL PSYCHOPHARMACOTHERAPY AND THE

(F. Ayd, Jr., ed. 1975); THE MENTALLY ILL AND THE RIGHT TO
TREATMENT (G. Morris ed. 1970).
59. To appreciate the abuses to which a "right to treatment" approach lends
RIGHT TO TREATMENT

itself, it should be noted that the "treatment" accorded inmates is often described as
"milieu therapy"-a euphemisn for stark custodial confinement. O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 569 (1975). See also Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 388,535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975). A commentator has noted that the adequacy of treatment is an amorphous and intangible concept,
and furthermore, is an easy therapeutic claim for an institution to assert, yet most
difficult for a patient to refute. Halpern, A Practicing Lawyer Views the Right to
Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 782 (1969).
60. For an excellent discussion of the traditional constitutional basis for the right
to refuse treatment see Comment, Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right
to Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975).
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very sick people their right to opportunities to have their
health improved, their illnesses better treated, and their
death prevented.'

Another doctor has declared:
I think one should go the extreme of always explaining
to a patient if he is going to get electroshock, why he is
going to get it and what it is going to be like and so forth
and so on. But as far as getting permission from the patient
is concerned, this is not necessary. 2

Without questioning the sincerity of these professionals, it
must be observed that there is a potential conflict when a physician's judgment collides with an individual's right to refuse
psychiatric procedures. The law must take account of more
than a physician's sincerity, diligence and professional competence. There must also be an assessment in each instance of the
views and legal rights of the prospective subject. A bare "right
to treatment" does not provide that perspective.
Our system guarantees the right to risk making the wrong
decision. In Farettav. California, the Supreme Court declared
a limit to paternalism and observed that personal decisions
belong to those who will sustain their consequences:
"[W]hatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of
Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood the
inestimable worth of free choice."" Surely when we accord peo61. Ayd, Jr., Treatment-Resistant Patients: A Moral, Legal and Therapeutic
Challenge, in RATIONAL PSYCHOPHARMACOTHERAPY AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 41 (F.
Ayd, Jr., ed. 1975). Further enunciation of this thinking is present in this statement
by Dr. Ayd:
In the past 25 years, and particularly since I became engrossed in psychopharmacotherapy in 1952, I have treated, or as a consultant, I have
guided the treatment of many apparently and truly treatment-resistant
patients. Happily, many of these people have been helped substantially.
This has happened because of new therapies and because I have firm
convictions that a sick person has a moral and legal right to treatment,
that a doctor has a moral obligation to be therapeuticallypersistent and
innovative, and that physicians and patients are morally justified in
taking legitimate risks in their joint efforts to restore health.
Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
62. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary87th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 155 (1961) (statement of Dr. Guttmacher).
63. 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 (1975). In the last decade there has been evidence of
growing distrust among appellate courts towards paternalistic doctrines based on a
"treatment" rationale and towards programs created ostensibly to "help" the offender
or deviant. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338,
535 P.2d 273, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975); In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 486 P.2d 1201,
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ple a right to treatment we must assure them the right to
refuse.
CONSENT AND MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION

If there exists a fundamental right to mentation, it necessarily follows that medical and surgical procedures which are
intended to affect mentation, thought, and personality require
greater constitutional scrutiny and review than do other procedures. 4 It is equally apparent that when medical and surgical
procedures involve such high risks and uncertain benefits as to
be essentially experimental in nature,65 the informed consent of
the intended subject becomes an absolute condition precedent
to the utilization of that procedure.
In this section we seek to demonstrate that psychosurgical
and convulsive procedures, as the most drastic forms of organic
behavior controls, are such experimental procedures."6 We then
96 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971). Contrast such skepticism with the Supreme Court's more
hopeful view of such an approach in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
64. In this section we have drawn heavily from Brief for Lawyers Committee to
Support AB 4481, as Amicus Curiae, Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662 (1976). See
13 DUQUESNE L. REV. 673-936 (1975) for a symposium on medical experimentation
where many diverse viewpoints are presented.
65. The legal determination of whether or not a given procedure is experimental
is not a question to be answered by resort to convention. That a given modality is
generally accepted by practitioners and has been widely used does not in itself resolve
the issue. See note 66 infra.
The empirical evaluation of treatment results presents two significant problems.
First, detetmination of "improvement" and "benefit" tends to be highly subjective.
Second, studies to date are not supported by an adequate scientific foundation. For
instance, the only available data on psychosurgery is provided by psychosurgeons,
chiefly in medical journal articles. The surgeons themselves evaluate post-operative
results, using purely normative standards such as "improves," "much improved," and
"worse." There are no control groups and little or no effort is made to measure the
placebo effect of the operation or the effect of the special care and services rendered
in conjunction with surgery. Breggin, The Return of Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, 118
CONG. REC. 5567, 5573 (1972).
A similar situation exists with regard to convulsive procedures. "[T]he data is
simply unsound with regard to how often it works, and most particularly with regard
to the side effects. Therefore, the patient cannot make a very meaningful consent...
if they do not know what the risks are." Letter from Lee Coleman, M.D., psychiatrist,
to Robert Roth (October 29, 1976) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV. and the Center for
the Study of Legal Authority and Mental Patient Status, Hartford, Conn.]
[hereinafter cited as Coleman Letter].
66. In this discussion it may be helpful to make an explicit statement of our
criteria for determining the experimental or nonexperimental nature of a procedure.
The essential criterion is whether or not there has been sufficient evidence and research
to show that the ratio of benefits to risks is sufficiently well established that the
prospective subject has enough information to assess the predicted outcome within
reasonable limits. If there has not been enough research, or if research has shown that
the possible benefits are not very high compared to the risks, or if the results of research
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discuss why informed consent is requisite before administering
an experimental procedure on either a confined or nonconfined
person. We also present our position that, even in the event
these procedures should cease to be experimental in nature,
informed consent would nevertheless be constitutionally mandated as a precondition to their implementation.
PsychosurgicalProcedures
"Psychosurgery" has been defined as "the surgical removal or destruction of brain tissue or the cutting of brain
tissue to disconnect one part of the brain from another, with
the intent of altering [thoughts and/or] behavior."" Furthermore, psychosurgery is usually "performed in the absence of
direct evidence of existing structural disease or brain damage.""8 There is considerable professional disagreement over
are too inconclusive to estimate outcome within reasonable limits, then we would
characterize the procedure as experimental. Coleman Letter, supra note 65.
We consider this characterization to be critical in view of the California Court of
Appeal's decision in Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, as
modified, 58 Cal. App. 3d 990a, 59 Cal. App. 3d 174d (1976). This case involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of California legislation regulating the administration of psychosurgical and convulsive procedures. The court stated at the outset that
not the efficacy of treatments" and on that basis did
the case involved "consent ....
not consider it necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing on the factual nature of the
procedures in question. Id. at 670-71. Yet later in the opinion, in distinguishing between regulations aimed at psychosurgery and those regarding convulsive procedures,
the court apparently found the factual nature of the procedures involved to be dispositive of the legal issues. Thus, regulations concerning psychosurgical procedures were
deemed legitimate in light of the "hazardous, experimental nature of psychosurgery"
while regulations regarding convulsive procedures-an "almost identical" regulatory
scheme in the eyes of the court-were struck down essentially on the basis that" 'shock
treatment,' or more precisely ECT, is not an experimental procedure, nor are its
hazards as serious as those of psychosurgery." Id. at 683-84.
We disagree with the court's characterization of convulsive procedures as being
non-experimental, on the basis of the criteria explained above, and our discussion
accompanying notes 67-96, infra.
67. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, ED. & WELF.,
PSYCHOSURGERY: PERSPECTIVE ON A CURRENT ISSUE 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
DHEW] (emphasis added).
68. Id. For a description of psychosurgical techniques see Greenblatt,
Psychosurgery, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1291-95 (A. Friedman & H.
Kaplan eds. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Greenblatt].
Psychosurgery is distinguished from neurosurgery in that the former encompasses
"operations on the brain for the purpose of altering thoughts or feelings or behavior
for which there is no established physical cause. There is no brain disease which is
being treated, in contrast to neurosurgery, where there is a tumor or abcess . . .
" which are operated upon. Testimony of Lee S.
physical lesions of the brain ....
Coleman, M.D., Hearings on AB 1032 Before the California Assembly Permanent
Subcomm. on Health and Developmental Disabilities, (1975) (on file at the office of
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what portion of the brain should be operated upon to affect a
given type of thought or behavior. Researchers for the Department of Health Education and Welfare have stated:
We believe that knowledge and understanding of the relation between the brain and behavioral abnormalities and
of the optimal treatment of such abnormalities are still in
very early stages. Even though there has been a vast
amount of recent animal research our knowledge of brain
function is still insufficient for a clear understanding about
what parts of the brain control what behaviors.
The efficacy of psychosurgery, as well as the mechanism
by which it causes its effects, is in serious question. 0 While
medical journals contain many specific case histories of psychosurgical operations, there have been few if any systematic,
methodologically sound, comparative studies performed to determine whether psychosurgery is effective in alleviating alleged psychiatric disorders.7 '
In 1972 Dr. Peter Breggin, after an extensive review of the
medical literature on this point, concluded:
Scientifically, lobotomy and psychosurgery have no
rational or empirical basis. Empirically, no study has ever
been done involving matched control groups. That is, no
one has ever taken two similar groups and subjected one
to surgery and left one alone for comparison. This is the
scientific method at its best and it is totally absent from
the hundreds of pro-lobotomy articles in both the first and
second waves of psychosurgery.
Three controlled studies have been done retrospectively matching as nearly as possible the surgical groups
and the regular [psychiatric] hospital population upon
which no surgery was done. .

.

. In all three studies lobo-

tomy was found to have no beneficial effect whatsoever
72

the Subcommittee, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law Library, Sacramento, California, and Yale University Law Library, New Haven, Connecticut and
SANTA CLARA L. REV.).

A very helpful definition of psychosurgery for regulatory purposes is contained in
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325 (g) (West Supp. 1976).
69. DHEW, supra note 67, at 8 (emphasis added). See also discussion in Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County,
Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973) excerpted in 2 PRISON L. Rr. 433, 473-74 (1973).
70. Id.
71. Breggin, The Return of Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, 118 CONG. REc. 5567,
5575 (1972).
72. Id. at 5567 (citations omitted). For an example of such a study, see McKenzie
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It is clear, moreover, that psychosurgery has serious

deleterious effects. By definition, when psychosurgery is performed, the brain is physically damaged and brain cells are
destroyed. Any damage to the brain of this sort is irreversible,
as brain cells are incapable of regeneration. These are inherent
aspects of a "successful" psychosurgical procedure. Furthermore, studies indicate that psychosurgery may produce considerable and perhaps even progressive deterioration of the treatment subject's personality.7" It has been found that psychosurgery frequently and unpredictably results in a general flattening of emotional responses,74 impairment of the ability to think
conceptually,75 a loss of creativity," and reduction in drive." In
some cases the post-operative patient may experience extreme
fluctuations in emotions within a short period of time.78
Physiological effects may also occur, including postoperative
grand mal seizures,79 blindness," and death.8 '
Convulsive Procedures
"Convulsive procedure" is a term which includes, but is
not limited to, electroshock therapy (ECT), insulin coma therapy, and other convulsive procedures such as inhalation or intravenous injection of hexafluorodiethyl ether.
The various convulsive procedures have one aspect in common: the treatment causes the patient to undergo a seizure of
grand mal intensity. This seizure, according to its proponents,
results in beneficial psychological changes in the patient.
There is no definitive or generally accepted theory of convulsive
procedures: the mechanism by which a seizure causes its var& Kaczanowski, Prefrontal Leukotomy: A Five-Year Controlled Study, 91 CAN. MED.
ASS'N J. 1193 (1964). Since the supposed therapeutic benefits occur in all forms of
psychosurgery, these studies, although limited to lobotomy, are relevant to all psychosurgical techniques.
73. See generally Greenblatt, supra note 68, at 1293-94.
74. Breggin, The Second Wave, 57 MENTAL HYGIENE 10, 12 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Breggin].
75. Greenblatt, supra note 68 at 1293.
76. Freeman, Psychosurgery, in 2 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1526, 153435 (S. Arieti ed. 1959).
77. Greenblatt & Myerson, Medical Progress:Psychosurgery, 240 NEW ENGLAND
J. MED. 1006, 1014 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Greenblatt & Myerson].
78. Id. at 1015.
79. Id. at 1012.
80. Breggin, supra note 74, at 11, reports such a case.
81. See, e.g., Greenblatt & Myerson, supra note 77, at 1012, where the death rate
was reported to be from one to four percent.
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ious effects is unknown, and theories regarding such mechanisms are highly speculative. 2
The efficacy of convulsive procedures in producing the effects desired by the administering party is, moreover, subject
to serious question. 3 Most studies on the effects of convulsive
procedures are equivocal because of a failure to employ sound
scientific methodology. 4 It is important to note the many
sound studies which report that persons treated with convulsive therapy did not improve significantly more than control
82. There exists no definitive or generally accepted theory of shock treatment.
Krouner, Shock Therapy and PsychiatricMalpractice: The Legal Accomodation to a
ControversialTreatment 2 FORENS. Sci. 397, 399-400 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Krouner]. One investigator noted that: "In 1948, Gordon was able to write a paper entitled
'Fifty shock therapy theories.' Since then, theories have continued to multiply ....
It is . . . obvious that none of the theories . . . so far is near to being considered
adequate." Miller, Psychological Theories of ECT: A Review, 113 BRIT. J. PSYCHIAT.
301, 307 (1967). This researcher suggests three reasons for the failure of theoretical
attempts to explain and justify shock treatment: (1) organic causes, if any, of mental
disorders remain largely unknown; (2) systematic attempts to explore the effects of
shock treatment are rare, and there is little or no well-established information on these
effects; and (3) many theories have been so speculative that it is difficult or impossible
to test them. Id. at 307, 308.
Several of the major shock therapy theories are ethically questionable. For example, one theory argues that it is the fear induced by the procedure which is the effective
agent. Id. at 303. Under a second theory, known as the "regressive" or "depatterning"
theory, the purpose of shock treatment is to reduce the subject to infantile levels in
order to structure his or her development. Id. at 304. In one reported experiment, the
doctors shocked subjects twice daily until "depatterning" occurred; that is, until patients were in a state of helplessness, apathy and confusion, exhibiting memory loss,
speech alterations, and gross disorientation. Cameron, Lohrenz & Handcock, The Depatterning Treatment of Schizophrenis, 3 COMP. PSYCHIAT. 65 (1962).
It is interesting to note that the means by which psychosurgical and convulsive
procedures achieve their effects are not clearly established. Although it is not understood how many other bona fide treatments achieve their results (See Coleman Letter,
supra note 65), we maintain that the uncertainties regarding causality of these procedures highlight the issue of their unpredictability.
There are at least fifty theories of how convulsive procedures achieve their effects.
Krouner, supra, at 399. Particularly disturbing among the many theories of how convulsive procedures work is the suggestion that brain damage is the effctive mechanism,
(Coleman Letter, supra note 65) and the conclusion of a neurologist that the causation
of amnesia is the means by which convulsive procedures "work." J. FRIEDBERG, SHOCK
TREATMENT IS NOT GOOD FOR YOUR BRAIN (1976). These two theories are of course
mutually consistent and may perhaps be viewed as alternative conceptualizations of
a single theory. Dr. Coleman contends that there is no evidence to support the belief
that it is the seizure which produces such results and concludes that "[any procedure
which damages the brain, including a strong blow with a 2x4, would be just as effective" as convulsive procedures. Coleman Letter, supra note 65.
83. See, e.g., Salzman, An Evaluation of Shock Therapy, 103 AM. J. PSYCHIAT.
669 (1947).
84. Riddell, The Therapeutic Efficacy of ECT: A Review of the Literature, 8
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIAT.

546, 553-56 (1963).
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groups whose members did not receive such treatment. An
exhaustive review of the literature recently concluded:
Despite all the studies, the effectiveness of ECT
[electroconvulsive therapy] remains unproven . . . . The
glowing claims of success for ECT have followed the cyclical pattern of most therapeutic fashions in psychiatry. The
discoverer of the treatment boasts the best results for the
broadest indications, while subsequent researchers find
diminished success and fewer and fewer indications. 5
There are also significant harmful effects which obtain
from the utilization of convulsive procedures. A commentator
discussing one form of convulsive treatment has extended this
caveat:
Since dangerous, and even fatal complications may readily
occur, it is essential that both physician and nurse possess
sufficient experience and skill to enable them to recognize
and deal immediately with emergency situations. Even
though both possess these qualities the mortality rate will
be from 0.5 to 1 per cent.8"
The simplest and most treatable complication of convulsive procedures is bone fracture resulting from the muscular
contractions which occur during the induced seizure. Although
the risk of bone fracture has been reduced with the utilization
of pharmacological agents which relax muscles and anesthesize
the treatment subject, 7 "the statement remains valid that
fractures are entirely unpredictable." 88 It should be noted that
while these adjuvants reduce the frequency of bone fracture,
their use results in other problems. For example, the agents
increase the risk of cardiovascular complications, respiratory
arrest and aspiration pneumonia.
In addition to these physical effects, there are also serious
psychological complications which occur more frequently. The
most common are "postconvulsive restlessness, confusion, psychotic episodes, startle reactions and memory impairment
"" Memory loss may be permanent and severe."
85. Friedberg, Electroshock Therapy: Let's Stop Blasting the Brain, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, Aug., 1975, at 98 [hereinafter cited as Friedberg].
86. L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 649 (8th ed. 1973).
87. For example, succinylcholine and ultra-short-acting barbiturates are presently being utilized to control convulsions. Krouner, supra note 82, at 402.
88. Id. at 403.
89. Beresford, Legal Issues Relating to Electroconvulsive Therapy, 25 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIAT. 100, 101 (1971).
90. Krouner, supra note 82, at 403.
Regarding the distinction between physiological and psychological effects, it is
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Recent psychological testing of treatment subjects and
control groups has suggested that the source of these and other
psychological effects of convulsive procedures may be brain
damage,9" perhaps permanent brain damage.93 Some scientists
have argued that the brain damage caused by convulsive procedures is analogous to,9" or greater than, the brain damage
caused by psychosurgery. 5
The medical literature indicates the extent and degree to
which researchers are questioning the efficacy and advisability
of psychosurgical and convulsive procedures. There are
staunch supporters of these treatment modalities, but there is
much professional disagreement over what these procedures
suggested that such phenomena as post-convulsive restlessness, confusion, and memory impairment are psychological manifestations of the brain damage which results
from the procedures. "Restlessness, confusion and memory impairment are classical
signs of brain damage. Therefore, they are best considered as physical complications
which also happen to show certain psychological manifestations." Coleman Letter,
supra note 65, at 2-3.
91. Goldman, Gomer& Templer, Long-Term Effects of Electroconvulsive Therapy upon Memory and Perceptual-MotorPerformance, 28 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 32, 33
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Goldman]; Lewis & Maher, Neural Consolidation and
Electroconvulsive Shock, 72 PSYCHOL. REv. 225 (1965).
Although it is usually stated that these mental complications are temporary,
lasting only a few days to a week, some recipients of convulsive therapy have a different
view. In Roueche, Annals of Medicine: As Empty as Eve, 50 THE NEW YORKER, Sept.,
9, 1974, at 96, is reported the case of a financial analyst-economist who underwent a
series of eight electroshock treatments early in 1973. She was assured that the posttreatment amnesia she complained of would be temporary. Unfortunately, it was not.
After a period of convalescence she returned to work and discovered that "'all my
beloved knowledge, everything I had learned in my field during 20 years or more, was
gone. I'd lost the body of knowledge that constituted my professional skill. . . . But
it was worse than that. I felt that I'd lost myself ...
'Her attempt to regain memory
through psychiatric treatment was unsuccessful; the treating psychiatrist was of the
opinion that her memory loss was caused by brain damage. Needless to say, she could
not retain her job as an economist. She obtained a disability retirement and was doing
low level clerical work when the article went to press in the latter part of 1974. While
permanent memory loss may not be a typical side effect, the fact remains that it does
occur. She also lost the capacity to learn efficiently. Impaired learning ability of at
least a temporary nature is well documented. See sources indexed under
Complications, learning impairment, in M. GELLER, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH, ED. & WELF., STUDIES ON ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY 1939-1963: A
SELECTED ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Public Health Service Pub. No. 1447, 1966)

[hereinafter cited as GELLER].
92. See sources cited in GELLER, supra note 91.
93. Goldman, supra note 91, at 32.
94. Salzman, An Evaluation of Shock Therapy, 103 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 669, 672
(1947).
95. From Lobotomy to Physics to Freud-An Interview with Karl Pribram,5 AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS'N MONITOR, Sept.-Oct., 1974, at 9. Some physicians are advocating the
total abolition of psychosurgery (Breggin, supra note 74) and shock therapy (Friedberg,
supra note 85).
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accomplish. It is clear that there are serious and often unpredictable effects, both primary and secondary, which may result
from their utilization. We are thus led to the conclusion that
convulsive procedures, as well as psychosurgical, may appropriately be categorized as experimental."
Consent to Experimental Treatments That Alter Mentation
The question of human experimentation has attracted extensive discussion within both the medical97 and legal" professions. Despite persistent arguments by medical researchers
that psychosurgical experimentation is essential for understanding the human brain and human behavior," the growing
trend in the law is directed toward restricting the availability
of involuntarily confined populations as human subjects. 00 In
96. See note 65 supra.
97. American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, in
Supplementary Report of the Judicial Council, 132 J.A.M.A. 1090 (1946); AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL INVESTIGATION (1966); World
Medical Association, Code of Ethics (Declarationof Helsinki), reprinted in 2 BRIT.
MED. J. 177 (1964).
98. See citations in Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 7319434-AW (Wayne County Mich. Cir. Ct., 1973) excerpted in 2 PRISON L. RPrR. 433
(1973). The court in Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 282, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935),
stated:
We recognize the fact that if the general practice of medicine and surgery
is to progress, there must be a certain amount of experimentation carried
on; but such experiments must be done with the knowledge and consent
of the patient or those responsible for him, and must not vary too radically from the accepted method of procedure.
See generally Kidd, Limits of the Right of a Person to Consent to Experimentation on
Himself, 117 SCIENCE 211 (1953); Ladimer, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings, 3 J. PUB. L. 467, 487 (1954); Note, Experimentation on
Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99 (1967).
99. V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN (1970); Mark, Sweet & Ervin,
The Effect of Amygdalotomy on Violent Behavior in Patients with Temporal Lobe

Epilepsy, in

PSYCHOSURGERY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PSY-

2D, COPENHAGEN, 1970, at 135, 153 (E. Hitchcock, L. Laitinen, & K.
Vaernet, eds. 1972); Mark, Brain Surgery in Aggressive Epileptics, 3 THE HASTINGS
CENTER REPT. (Feb. 1973); CENTER FOR STUDY AND REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE, NEUROPSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE, PLAN OF PROGRAM, JULY 1, 1973-JUNE 30, 1974 (U.C.L.A.).
100. ' See, e.g., Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 2670-2680 (West Supp. 1976); Statement of Alvin J. Bronstein, National
Prison Project of ACLU Foundation, Hearings on H.R. 3603 Before Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, House Comm. of the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (unpublished); HEW regulations for protection of
human subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 et seq. (1975); National Research Service Award
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, Title II, § 201-205, (July 12, 1974) 88 Stat. 348-51,
U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS, 386 (1974) (creating a National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research and standards
therefor).
CHOSURGERY,
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Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, the court moved
in this direction by determining that experimental behavior
control modalities require more judicial scrutiny than do established therapeutic modalities.''
These legal developments in the area of human experimentation have created mechanisms which seek to assure that no
psychosurgery or other behavioral research proceed without the
consent of the subject.' Recently the elements of consent to
experimentation have developed along the lines of the Nuremberg formulation, which defined three separate elements:
knowledge, voluntariness, and competence or capacity. 03 This
formulation has been generally followed by the courts and leg04
islative bodies.

The Kaimowitz court took the position that involuntarily
detained persons are not capable of giving informed consent as
defined by the Nuremberg Trials. Because of the effects of
institutionalization and the daily control over the lives of inmates, the court concluded that neither the knowledge, volition
nor competency tests can be met in securing the consent of
confined persons:
Although an involuntarily detained mental patient may
have a sufficient I.Q. to intellectually comprehend his cir101. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), excerpted in
2 PRISON L. RPrR. 433, 476 (1973); Note, for example, the court's distinction:
We do not agree that a truly informed consent cannot be given for a
regular surgical procedure by a patient, institutionalized or not. The law

has long recognized that such valid consent can be given. But we do hold
that informed consent cannot be given by an involuntarily detained mental patient for experimental psychosurgery.
102. For example, the California legislature has prohibited the use of psychosurgery except where the subject has given informed consent. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
5325 et seq. (West Supp. 1976). Recent amendments to the California law prescribe in
detail the procedure to be followed in obtaining consent to psychosurgery and shock
therapy. For an extensive analysis of this bill before it became law, see Comment,
Informed Consent, supra note 2; Comment, Legislative Control of Shock Treatment,
9 U.S.F.L. REV. 738 (1975). AB 1032 was a follow-up measure in response to the
litigation concerning AB 4481. We might mention that AB 4481 was itself patterned
initially on a piece of model legislation authored by Darlene Dolan for the Mental
Patient Law Project, LAMP, in 1973 [on file at Yale Law School Library].
103. United States v. Karl Brandt, TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, Vols. 1 & 2, THE MEDICAL CASE, (U.S. Printing Office, 1948),
reprinted in J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 305 (1972).
104. For example, this formulation was adopted by the court in Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct.
1973), excerpted in 2 PRISON L. RPTR. 433, and as we shall demonstrate, by the California legislature when it adopted CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5325 et seq. (West Supp.
1976).
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cumstance,. . . the very nature of his incarceration diminishes the capacity to consent to psychosurgery. He is particularly vulnerable as a result of his mental condition, the
deprivation stemming from involuntary confinement, and
the effects of the phenonemon of "institutionalization"."' 5
The implicit coercion of institutionalization and lack of sufficient information about the true nature of the experiments
being performed requires that experimentation on confined
populations be heavily restricted. It is our position that experimentation on a confined individual creates a strong inference
that there has been no consent.
These same considerations frequently apply to nonconfined subjects who would submit to psychosurgery or convulsive procedures. Consent has not always been obtained in
securing subjects for behavior research. A substantial number
of the psychiatrists employing convulsive procedures, which
are simpler, less expensive, more accepted and more commonly
used than psychosurgery, still do not consider it necessary to
obtain the consent of the subject. For example, one physician
has written: "In actual fact the occasions when a patient might
have to be treated against his will are relatively rare nowadays
but do exist. In such circumstances I would not hesitate to treat
the patient anyway if I am certain it is necessary."'0 6 Nevertheless, because we are dealing with mind-altering and essentially
experimental modalities, no treatment should proceed until it
is legally established that the subject has clearly manifested
consent.
Consent to "Non-Experimental" Treatments to Alter
Mentation
The constitutional and tort considerations we have expressed must extend to a hypothetical point in time when arguably neither psychosurgical nor convulsive procedures remain
experimental.0 7 It would seem incumbent upon us to consider
what the law should be with respect to the manipulation of
105. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), excerpted in 2 PRISON L. RPrR. 433, 476 (1973).
106.

R. PECK, THE MIRACLE OF SHOCK TREATMENT 34-35 (1974).

107. Considering the complexity of the human brain, it may be that expected
improvements in the alleged precision of these procedures will in principle be limited
or remain insubstantial. The point has yet to be reached where mentation and behavior
may be altered with any degree of precision whatsoever, let alone without severe and
multiple "side effects."
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human mentation when and if available psychotechnologies
satisfactorily develop the physical means of altering behavior
and mental mechanisms without adverse effects or unintended
results.
The Kaimowitz court left open for future consideration
what should be done should psychosurgery cease to be experimental:
[The] conclusion is based upon the state of the knowledge
as of the time of the writing of this Opinion. When the
state of medical knowledge develops to the extent that the
type of psychosurgical intervention proposed here becomes
an accepted neurosurgical procedure and is no longer experimental, it is possible, with appropriate review mechanisms, that involuntarily detained mental patients could
consent to such an operation.' 8
We have no quarrel with the Kaimowitz position that,
should a point be reached when psychosurgery is no longer
experimental, people may consent to such an operation. However, if freedom of mentation is a fundamental right, as we
believe it is, it follows a fortiori that a procedure which seeks
to alter mentation cannot be imposed without the informed
consent of the individual. Thus, the dispositive factor is not the
experimental nature of psychosurgery and convulsive procedures, but rather the constitutional questions which are triggered by the attempt to alter mentation.
We have relied heavily on the concept of consent throughout this article and argued extensively that its presence is the
key to administration of procedures affecting mentation; we
now turn to an analysis of that concept.
INFORMED CONSENT-AN ANALYSIS

It is our position that competency as an element of informed consent is unnecessary and possibly invidious. Before
discussing the reasons for this view, we present, as background,
the currently accepted rationale for including competency in
informed consent and our reasons for taking a contrary view.
We then illustrate the potential invidiousness of the competency element via an examination of recently enacted California legislation. Finally, we turn to institutionalized persons
108. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973) excerpted in 2 PRISON L. RpR. 433, 478 (1973).
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and observe how the element of competency serves as a bootstrap denying such persons the right to give or withhold informed consent.
The Shapiro Analysis
In his article Legislating the Control of Behavior
Control,'0 Professor Shapiro discusses the delicate issue of behavior control achieved by imposition of organic procedures,
ostensibly as a means of furthering compelling state interests.
We turn briefly to his analysis because it is a well-articulated
presentation of a position that has been adopted in legislation."' We will then present our objections to this view.
Professor Shapiro establishes that freedom of mentation is
a fundamental constitutional right."' He then presents arguments, for the purpose of discussion, which support the conclusion that given sufficient proof of a compelling state interest,
the law may countenance the use of organic procedures even
without the consent of the individual who is to submit to the
procedure."'
Professor Shapiro views the arguments for the existence of
such compelling interests as both "positive"" 3 and "negative""' in nature. The "positive" argument for legitimately
compelling submission to these procedures, even over "competent" refusal, is characterized as enhancement of the personal
autonomy of the individual by restoring him or her to sanity.
The "negative" approach to legitimately compelling submission to such procedures over competent protest supports the
interest of protecting persons and property from an individual
who is in an allegedly disordered state. Shapiro rejects what he
characterizes as utilitarian arguments for a "negative" approach to the extent they justify imposition of organic treatment over competent objection." 5 Since there are other alterna109. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 276-96.
110. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 2670 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
111. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 253-76.
112. Id. at 279-80.
113. Id. at 282-90.
114. Id. at 291-96.
115. Id. at 292-93. Shapiro notes that "some researchers in the field of behavior
control apparently regard personal autonomy and privacy-as passing conventions."
Delgado in Physical Manipulation of the Brain, THE HASTINGS CENTER REr'r. 11 (Spec.
Supp. May, 1973), stated, "The inviolability of the brain is only a social construct,

like nudity." See B.

SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND

DIGNrrIY (1971); Ingraham &

Smith, The Use of Electronics in the Observationand Control of Human Behavior and
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tives, such as confinement, which protect society and do not
infringe as intrusively on personal autonomy, Shapiro concludes that constitutional considerations justify the acceptance
of a "per se rule against substitution of a person's competent
judgment.""'
Shapiro's per se rule hinges upon the individual being a
competent person-one deemed to have the capacity to exercise informed judgment. In the case of a person who is deemed
to lack capacity to give consent or to manifest competent refusal to these procedures, Shapiro feels that substitution of
judgment and forced treatment may be acceptable, with close
scrutiny, a "strict standard of review,""' 7 and the "informed
adjudication of a court,""" based upon either the "positive""'
or "negative"'' 0 approach.
Its Possible Use for Rehabilitationand Parole, IssuEs INCRWM. 35 (1972). Cf., BEYOND
THE PUNITIVE SOCIETY (H. Wheeler, ed. 1973); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 293 n.191.

116. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 294.
117. Id. at 289.
118. Id. at 300.
119. Id. at 288-89:
[Aissume that the patient's illness substantially erodes his capacity to
make an informed decision conerning therapy. .

.

. Suppose the subject

.. . lacks the capacity for informed consent and refuses any organic
therapy proffered. Our presumption requires us to accord this "disordered" refusal some degree of deference. But most persons, were they to
consider the matter at all, would probably consider the presumption
overcome when any given decision is thought to be substantially affected
by (or in some sense "a product of") mental abnormality. Is this because
we think that the consequences of a disordered choice are more likely to
be productive of an excess of evil over good than those of a healthy choice?
If so, substituted judgment is not only justified, but obligatory on classical utilitarian grounds. .

.

. Or is it thought that an incompetent person

is in some sense "not himself," and that in deference to the ideal of
personal autonomy, destructive ventures on his part ought to be prevented at least until, under the influence of treatment or otherwise, "he
returns" or "becomes himself" again and can act freely?
Because of a panoply of considerations such as these, highly disordered thought simply does not rank very high on anyone's list of valuable
things or interests. . . . When the balancing act in a constitutional analysis is performed, then overcoming the presumption protecting disordered
mentation and permitting therapy for the purpose of restoring "normal"
mentation does not seem terribly difficult.
(Emphasis added).
120. Id. at 294: "The proposed legislative alternatives contemplate the
imposition of chemotherapy and certain organic conditioning techniques over the protest of persons lacking the capacity for informed consent." Note that in his proposed
statutes Shapiro ruled out the use of either psychosurgery or electroshock or other
electrical stimulation of the brain on persons lacking in capacity to give informed
consent. Shapiro continues:
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We disagree. Our position is that no burden of compelling
state interest can be met which can overcome the individual's
basic right to refuse psychiatric procedures that would alter
mentation, effect change in personality and invade the very
core of that person's autonomy. 2 ' Since confinement of violent
individuals serves as a less drastic alternative to safeguard
other individuals and society generally, the state's interest cannot prevail over that of the individual whose personality and
mentation is sought to be altered.'2 2
Shapiro adopts an informed consent standard-that no
organic procedures begin without the informed consent of the
competent subject. We depart from Shapiro's approval of substituted judgment in situations where informed consent is not
obtainable from a person deemed incompetent. It is our position that no organic procedures should be administered unless
there is the positive informed consent of the person who is to
be subjected to the procedures, and that competency as traditionally conceived should not be an element in the evaluation
One of the core rationales for this decision, articulated earlier, is that
if such capacity is lacking, it may be proper to assert that the person is
really making no judgment at all (if the disorder substantially destroys
functionality); or if a "judgment" is being made, it isn't really his (he is
"not himself"). It was also suggested that a person's disordered judgments (conceding them to be "his") are relatively lacking in value, and
so compulsion under such circumstances might not be unjust; the assault
on autonomy effected by coerced therapy would be far less than that
entailed by ignoring the judgment of one who is competent to decide
whether to undergo therapy. .

.

. [W]e are, by hypothesis, dealing with

a person who was thought to be a menace to persons or property, not just
himself-and might still be. In view of the benefits to be secured and
dangers to be avoided by imposing organic therapy upon persons lacking
such competence, then, the conclusion that the presumption against substitution of judgment is overcome seems fairly persuasive.
Id. at 294-95 (emphasis added).
121. Cf., R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 32-33 (1974):
[W]hy may not one violate persons for the greater social good? ...
Why not. . . hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit
other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is
no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own
good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with
their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of
others, uses him and benefits others. Nothing more. What happens is
something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social
good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not
sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate
person, that this is the only life he has.
122.

Cf., J. MILL, ON IABERTY 68 (Pelican ed. 1974): "[Tihe only purpose for

which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
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of such a consent. The only exception should be emergency
cases where there is a clear and imminent danger of immediate
fatality unless the procedure in question is performed, and no
less drastic measures could avert that fatality.
A Reexamination of the EstablishedElements of Informed
Consent: Knowledge, Volition, and Competency
Our disagreement with Shapiro's conclusions stems from
a different conceptualization of competency or capacity as a
putative element of informed consent. We cannot resolve the
problems presented by organic behavior control procedures
without a reappraisal of the currently accepted elements of the
standard of informed consent.
Because of the fundamental circularity in the conceptual
framework of the competency test, the prospective treatment
subject is put in a situation from which he or she cannot escape. Competency should be deleted from the informed consent standard, leaving the elements of knowledge and volition
as the sole components.
Knowledge and volition are the necessary elements of informed consent. The law accepts the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights based upon knowledge and voluntariness
where the state seeks to abridge the freedom, or even take the
life, of a person. Knowledge-adequacy and understanding of
information-and volition-circumstances allowing for freedom of choice-are the twin tests applied to the admission of

guilty pleas,'23 admission of confessions, 2 ' and waiver of essen123. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969) (holding that before
receiving a guilty plea, the court must ask the defendant about his intention to plead
guilty, must canvass the pleas with the defendant to determine that "he has full
understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences"; must explain the
elements of the offense charged, potential defenses, maximum and minimum penalties, and must make an inquiry into the actual facts of the case). See also FED. R. CRIM.
P. 11 which provides, in part:
(d) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of
promises apart from a plea agreement. ...
(f) Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should
not enter a judgment upon such a plea without making such inquiry as
shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.
124. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding, inter alia, that
the defendant may waive his several rights-to remain silent, to have the assistance
and presence of counsel-provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
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tial constitutional rights such as the right to counsel in both

criminal" 5 and civil 6 proceedings. If freedom of mentation is
a fundamental right, the same standards should apply when
people clearly manifest their desire to forego or undergo treatment affecting that mentation.
Competency should not be an element of informed
consent. The established elements of informed consent in mental health law are knowledge, volition, and competency. Competency is typically referred to by courts or legislatures as "intelligence" or "judgment." Parens patriae notions spawned a
protection model for the purpose of "saving" the "mentally
disordered" from their own "wrong" decisions. In order to prevent the "incompetent" from harming himself or others, the
element of competency or capacity was added to the traditional
elements of informed consent.' This formulation has been accepted as part of the complete informed consent package by
legislators, commentators such as Shapiro, and the Michigan
court in Kaimowitz. The "protection" afforded by the competency requirement, however, is hazardous, and possibly fatal,
to the prospective treatment subject's manifestation of an informed and voluntary decision with regard to the utilization of
organic behavior control procedures.
The courts occasionally use the word "intelligently" to assist in the explanation
of the knowledge and voluntariness factors necessary to support the admissibility of a
plea or the waiver of any other essential right of the accused. It is our position that
the use of the word "intelligently" is superfluous in this context as the courts are in
essence applying only the standards of knowledge and voluntariness.
125. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); "'[Clourts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and
• . . we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' A waiver is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." (emphasis added). See also Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948)
(requiring that no waiver of the right to counsel be accepted unless the court makes
the express finding that the defendant apprehends the nature of the charges, that he
appreciates the statutory offenses charged, the range of allowable punishment, the
possible defenses, the circumstances in mitigation, and "all other facts essential to a
broad understanding of the whole matter").
126. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96 (1972) (where the Court
indicated doubt that there could have been a waiver of procedural due process rights
given the nature of the adhesion sales contract involved, but found as a matter of fact
that there had been no waiver in any event); D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405
U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (waiver must be "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly"
made); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (wherein the court observed in civil, no less than criminal, proceedings, "courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver" of constitutional rights).
127. Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAv.
L. REv. 1212-19 (1974).
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Consent to psychosurgery and convulsive procedures
should be reviewed simply for knowledge (understanding based
on appropriate information) and volition (an act of will freely
made). Elements of "information" which incorporate the medical model of the situation such as "awareness of the nature and
seriousness of the condition" introduce an implicit judgmental
element which should be avoided.
The addition of the competency element gives authorities
the power, based upon personal opinions regarding the advisability of the decision or medical diagnoses concerning "mental
illness," to negate a voluntary and knowledgeable decision.
Where the negation of a person's informed and voluntary decision is founded upon the relative knowledge of the parties involved, this element of informed consent is reducible to the
knowledge criterion and thus adds nothing to the process.
Where this negation is based upon a medical diagnosis, it is
submitted that the state of the art is not sufficiently developed
to constitute a valid substitute for individual judgment. In
either case, and further developments in the art or science of
psychiatric diagnosis notwithstanding, it is proposed that the
individual's judgment is precisely what should be sacrosanct
(provided the decision involved is based on adequate information and is voluntary). The element of "competency" thus constitutes at best an unnecessary and perhaps an invidious component of any consent standard which might be employed in
such cases.
The inappropriateness of competency as an element in the
informed consent standard is underscored when we consider
the fundamental disagreement among members of the psychiatric and social science community. 2 ' The underlying consideration in whether or not to proceed with psychiatric procedures
is based on a concept of "mental illness" reflecting the predominant, but hardly the universal, professional view.2 9 Since
there is wide conceptual disagreement within these disciplines
as to the appropriateness of a positivistic medical model, and
hence the legitimacy of labeling individuals as "mentally ill,"
"mentally disordered," "incompetent," or "incapacitated," it
is inappropriate for the law on the basis of such conceptions to
countenance compelled administration of organic procedures
128. See text accompanying notes 8-16 supra.
129. See Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 835, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger J.,
concurring).
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which affect the very core of the individual.
Dean Alexander and Professor Szasz argue that no treatment for mental disorder should proceed without contractual
agreement between the patient and the person offering treatment, and that no valid agreement can be made without the
patient giving consent which is in every sense informed. 3 '
If the law is to accord to individuals the opportunity to
determine for themselves whether to submit to organic procedures which seek to alter their personalities (and we have
argued above that the Constitution and tort law allow nothing
less),' 3' then the sole concern must be whether the treatment
subject understands fully what is proposed, what may happen,
and what is the intended result, and voluntarily expresses his
desire to undergo the proposed procedures.
Informed Consent Under Recent CaliforniaLegislation
A brief analysis of recent California legislative efforts to
regulate the utilization of psychosurgical and compulsive procedures serves to illustrate the proposition that the inclusion
of the competency element in consent threatens rather than
protects the rights of persons subjected to organic procedures.
In the summer of 1976, AB 1032 was signed into law
amending sections 5325 and 5326 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code. The amendments provide that the informed
consent of the prospective subject is a condition precedent to
the administration of psychosurgical and convulsive procedures.'3
Section 5326.5(a) now states that the giving of written informed consent is indicated when "a person knowingly and
intelligently, without duress or coercion clearly and explicitly
130. Alexander & Szasz, supra note 52, at 537. As an interesting aside, Szasz and
Alexander point out that the early psychotherapists such' as Janet and Freud never
proceeded except with the consent of their patients:
[They] pioneered not only in practicing a novel type of psychiatric treatment, but more significantly [based] their contact with their clients on
a contract with them rather than with their surrogates (familial or judicial). In short, they treated their mental patients as if they were "sane"
enough to be accorded the dignity of entering into a binding contract with
them. It is for this reason that we view the early psychoanalysts as humanists and liberators; while their contemporary "liberal" followers who
do not hesitate to coerce where they cannot contract must be viewed in
the opposite light.
Id. at 554.
131. See text accompanying notes 26-51 supra.
132. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1109 at 4680, amending CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE
§ 5325 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
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manifests consent to the proposed therapy .
"..."33At first
glance this standard for informed consent might appear to be
comprised of only two elements: knowledge ("knowingly") and
volition ("without duress or coercion"). A third element,
however, is added by introduction of the notion that the alleged
consent must be "intelligently" made. Unless the word is
deemed redundant or superfluous (and there is no clear evidence to support such a conclusion), its addition to the requirements of knowledge and volition may logically be taken to
mean that a third, somewhat nebulous, but nonetheless critical
element is being added to the consent standard.
A fair reading of this ambiguous element in the consent
standard is that it provides a mechanism whereby a person's
judgment may be deemed inadequate or impaired in some
sense, even though adequate information has been supplied to
and understood by the prospective treatment subject, and a
decision meeting legal standards for voluntariness has been
made. Thus, an individual who possesses adequate information
as to the decision in question, and who exercises voluntary
choice in making that decision, may still be found not to have
acted "intelligently."
This reading of the new law is supported by another section which provides that no informed consent can be given
when the person lacks capacity to consent (or to refuse to consent). Capacity is defined as the ability to "understand or
knowingly and intelligently act upon the information" which
the attending physician must communicate to the person.' 34 It
may be presumed that "understanding" as a criterion is simply
an aspect of the standard for knowledge. To wit: an accurate
ingestion of information by the prospective subject would constitute knowledge or understanding. These two uses of the word
"intelligence" in AB 1032, however, constitute the doubleedged sword which is herein designated as the putative third
element of consent-competency.
Presumably this element may be construed as a protection
for the prospective subject. However, it could also be employed
to deny the validity of a refusal of psychiatric intervention or
to deny the validity of a putatively "incompetent" consent to
133. Id., § 6, at 4683-84, amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.5(a) (West
Supp. 1976).
134. Id., § 6, at 4684, amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5326.5(c) (West Supp.
1976).
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treatment. The point in either case is that introduction of this
element of judgment, designated in this case as "intelligence,"
may mean that, although an individual has knowledge of the
relevant factors involved in the choice before him or her and
exercises an apparently voluntary decision with regard thereto,
the designated authorities are provided with the power to conclude that the person in question "does not know what he is
doing" and to act on that conclusion.
The consent standard incorporated in this new legislation
provides extensive and specific disclosure requirements to assure that adequate information is supplied to the prospective
treatment subject. Thus the treating physician must clearly
and explicitly communicate to the patient:
(a) The reason for treatment, that is, the nature and
seriousness of the patient's illness, disorder or defect.
(b) The nature of the procedures to be used in the
proposed treatment, including its probable frequency and
duration.
(c) The probable degree and duration (temporary or
permanent) of improvement or remission, expected with or
without such treatment.
(d) The nature, degree, duration, and the probability of the side effects and significant risks, commonly
known by the medical profession, of such treatment, including its adjuvants, especially noting the degree and
duration of memory loss (including its irreversibility) and
how and to what extent they may be controlled, if at all.
(e) That there exists a division of opinion as to the
efficacy of the proposed treatment, why and how it works
and its commonly known risks and side effects.
(f) The reasonable alternative treatments, and why
the physician is recommending this particular treatment.
(g) That the patient has the right to accept or refuse
the proposed treatment, and that if he or she consents, has
the right to revoke his or her consent for any reason, at any
time prior to or between treatments.'35
This extensive list, if administered by the treating physician with a minimum of medical and psychiatric jargon, in the
spirit the legislature intended, should provide the patient with
an adequate informational basis for making the decision. All of
the components of this list, with the exception of subsection (g)
135.
1976).

Id., § 3.5, at 4683, amending CAL. WELF. & INST.

CODE §

5326.2 (West Supp.
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are apparently intended to provide the prospective treatment
subject with information relevant to his or her decision regarding the proposed procedure.
Subsection (a), however, is further evidence of the implicit
judgment element included as a component of the test for informed consent. It is precisely the judgment of the treatment
subject which is at issue in determining his or her putative
ability to understand "the nature and seriousness" of the alleged "illness, disorder or defect." Presumably, a person is not
seriously "ill" if he or she can express this degree of what, in
the professional jargon, constitutes "insight into his or her condition." On the other hand, a person who is deemed unable to
understand (or who refuses to agree to) the physician's interpretation of his or her alleged "illness" is deemed incompetent
to manifest valid consent or refusal, notwithstanding the presence of voluntariness and adequate knowledge. The person,
though informed, becomes a candidate for non-voluntary treatment.
Under the new law, if the patient cannot give informed
consent, there can be no psychosurgery. 8 Convulsive procedures, however, can be imposed over the objections of a person,
institutionalized or not, upon a finding of lack of capacity to
give or withhold consent and when consent is obtained from a
designated third party.'37 We believe that this third party consent is not a legitimate consent. Freedom of mentation is a
fundamental right, a personal right. When the alteration of
mentation is at issue, the right cannot be transferred or substituted.
Are InstitutionalizedPersons Ever Capable of Consent?
In an attempt to prevent abusive experimentation on prisoners, the Kaimowitz court wrestled with the question of
whether truly informed consent could ever be obtained from
institutionalized persons. It was essential to make such a determination in that case because an inmate had signed a very
explicit consent to psychosurgery,'s although some time later,
136. Id., § 7, at 4684-85, amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (West
Supp. 1976).
137. Id., § 8, at 4685, amending CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7 (West Supp.
1976).
138. The complete "Informed Consent" form signed by John Doe was quoted in
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County,
Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973) excerpted in 2 PRISoN L. Ri'ru. 433, 434 n. 5 (1973). The consent
acknowledged that conventional treatment had not enabled him to control his outburst
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having been released from the institution, he repudiated that
consent. 3" The Michigan court concluded that because the
subject was institutionalized, he was not competent to give
1 On the facts of that case, we agree that
informed consent. 40
informed
was lacking, but for different reasons.
Usingconsent
the three-element Nuremberg formulationknowledge, volition and competency-the court correctly
found that John Doe's consent could not be considered "voluntary" in the institutional context:
Involuntarily confined mental patients live in an inherently coercive institutional environment. Indirect and
subtle psychological coercion has profound effect upon the
patient population. Involuntarily confined patients cannot
reason as equals with the doctors and administrators over
whether they should undergo psychosurgery. They are not
able to voluntarily give informed consent because of the
inherent inequality in their position.'
The court noted that the law has always been solicitous of
persons contracting or executing wills under circumstances in
which there has been explicit or implicit coercion, or undue
influence, and has been most concerned with the voluntariness
of, for example, confessions admitted as evidence against the
of rage and antisocial behavior; acknowledged the general outlines of the operation to
be performed, including implantation of certain wires to record electrical activity;
acknowledged that if brain disturbance was limited to a small area, that part would
be destroyed by electrical current; acknowledged that there were a "number of risks"
which might be "potentially serious," and the nature of such risks including the possibility that he might not survive the operation; and stated his full awareness of such
risks and authorized the clinic and hospital to perform the procedures.
139. Id. at 477 n.23.
140. Id. at 474.
141. Id. at 477. The court also noted:
The Nuremberg standards require that the experimental subjects be
so situated as to exercise free power of choice without the intervention of
any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior
form of constraint or coercion. It is impossible for an involuntarily detained mental patient to be free of ulterior forms of restraint or coercion
when his very release from the institution may depend upon his cooperating with the institutional authorities and giving consent to experimental
surgery.
The involuntarily detained mental patient is in an inherently coercive atmosphere even though no direct pressures may be placed upon
him. He finds himself stripped of customary amenities and defenses. Free
movement is restricted. He becomes a part of communal living subject
to the control of the institutional authorities.
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declarant.142 The court concluded against this background that
no valid consent could be found from the facts before them,
because the consent could not have been voluntarily given.
The Kaimowitz court also considered the knowledge element of the informed consent standard and further concluded
that John Doe could not be construed to have given valid informed consent to psychosurgery,"' because his having sufficient knowledge hinged on the disclosure and explanation of
the treating physicians. Since these physicians themselves did
not have the requisite knowledge (as to predictable results,
adverse side effects, permanent or semi-permanent damage
incidental to the proposed technique) they obviously could not
communicate this knowledge to the treatment subject.
Although we have no conceptual problems with the first
and second prongs of the Kaimowitz analysis, competency as
the third, presents serious difficulties:
Although an involuntarily detained mental patient
may have a sufficient I.Q. to intellectually comprehend his
circumstance .

. . ,

the very nature of his incarceration

diminishes the capacity to consent to psychosurgery. He is
particularly vulnerable as a result of his mental condition,
the deprivation stemming from involuntary confinement,
and the effects of the phenomenon of "institutionalization."''
142.

Id. at 477:
The law has always been meticulous in scrutinizing inequality in
bargaining power and the possibility of undue influence in commercial
fields and in the law of wills. It also has been most careful in excluding
from criminal cases confessions where there was no clear showing of their
completely voluntary nature after full understanding of the consequences. No lesser standard can apply to involuntarily detained mental
patients.
See also Freund, Ethical Problems in Human Experimentation, 273 NEw ENGLAND J.
MED.

687-92 (1965):

I suggest . . . that [prison] experiments should not involve any promise
of parole or of commutation of sentence; this would be what is called in
the law of confessions undue influence or duress through promise of reward, which can be as effective in overbearing the will as threats of harm.
Nor should there be a pressure to conform within the prison generated
by the pattern of rejecting parole applications to those who do not participate.
See, e.g., Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 799 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 799 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
143. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973) excerpted in 2 PRISON L. RvrR. 433, 477 (1973).
144. Id. at 476.
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The competency element in this analysis adds nothing of significance to the strength of informed consent. Carefully analyzed, what the court regarded as factors indicating incapacity
can be viewed as knowledge or voluntariness factors. For example, in Kaimowitz the court said: "Competency requires the
ability of the subject to understand rationally the nature of the
procedure, its risks, and other relevant information. The standard governing required disclosure by a doctor is what a reasonable patient needs to know in order to make an intelligent
decision."' 45 Here, the competency considerations are actually
knowledge considerations regarding disclosures made by the
doctor and the patient's understanding of what is being undertaken. At another point, the court discusses as capacity what
is actually voluntariness:
The fact of institutional confinement has special force in
undermining the capacity of the mental patient to make a
competent decision on this issue, even though he be intellectually competent to do so. In the routine of institutional
life, most decisions are made for patients. ...
Institutionalization tends to strip the individual of the
support which permits him to maintain his sense of selfworth and the value of his own physical and mental integ146
rity.
In this situation, there may necessarily exist explicit or implicit
coercion, duress, and overreaching, all of which deal with the
element of volition, not competency.
Clearly, the concerns voiced by the Kaimowitz court under
the rubric of capacity or competency are equally sustainable
under the heading of volition or knowledge. The evidence of
institutionalization in that case undercuts any finding that the
written statement John Doe signed was truly informed consent,
not because Doe's confinement rendered him incompetent, but
because the fact of institutionalization in that particular case
made his "consent" involuntary.
When competency is accepted as an element of consent,
and the premise is adopted that no institutionalized person is
capable of giving informed consent, the self-determination of
institutionalized people is undermined. The result created is
exactly the opposite of that which we set out to achieve: the
use of nonconsensual organic procedures is prevented-but not
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
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because the potential subject has made that decision.
Although Professor Shapiro maintains that competency
should be an element of informed consent,'47 he insightfully
notes the undermining aspect in a rigid rule which declares
that prisoners lack the capacity to give "informed consent":
To assume in general that prisoners are not competent to
make such decisions would itself risk an erosion of the ideal
of personal autonomy. Such an assumption would relegate
prisoners as a class to a status in which they would have
little chance to prevail against a claimed right of the state
to substitute its judgment for theirs even on matters having nothing to do with therapy." 8
Utilizing the competency standard, even for what appears
to be a beneficial end, requires that the law deal with people
based upon their status, a path which the Supreme Court has
declined to follow in the areas of criminal prosecution'49 and
civil commitment.'50 The inherent danger in a finding that institutionalized persons are incompetent to consent to organic
behavior control modalities-although this may have the immediate positive result of stopping human experimentation
upon confined populations-is that it leads to the conclusion
that prisoners and involuntarily confined mental patients lack
capacity to make any decisions concerning themselves. This
inherent danger is avoided if the competency element is eliminated.
The original elements of consent-knowledge and volition-are eminently satisfactory in assuring valid consent to
organic procedures which seek to alter behavior and mentation.
If a court, in determining whether the consent of a person to a
specific procedure is informed, finds before it a person who fails
to respond to pertinent questions, or gives answers that indicate lack of understanding of his situation or what treatment
is proposed, then on the basis of the criterion of knowledge or
information, the court can find that consent is absent. Similarly, if the treatment subject is institutionalized, and the
147. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 307-11. He approves of the following formulation
of capacity: "a confined person lacks the capacity for informed consent if he cannot
understand, or knowingly, rationally and intelligently act upon, the information concerning, for example, the nature of the therapy and its effect upon his condition." Id.
at 311.
148. Id. at 319.

149.
150.

See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1961).
See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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court finds insufficient evidence that the decision was
voluntarily made due to the inherently coercive atmosphere,
then on grounds of voluntariness the court can find that consent is absent.
CONCLUSION AND A LEGISLATIVE MODEL

We have argued that freedom of mentation as a fundamental right expands the role of the law in the mental health area.
No organic procedures which affect mentation, whether they be
psychosurgical, convulsive, or other procedures, should proceed
without a complete review by a court to determine whether the
subject of the organic procedures has given knowing and voluntary consent.' 5'
In so determining, the court must look to factual matters,
and we submit that circumstances of knowledge and volition
are factual. Competency and capacity, by contrast, are statements of value or ascriptions of status and are ultimately based
on theoretical constructs that the law should not adopt in its
determinations regarding the fundamental rights of citizens.
This distinction between factual matters, theoretical constructs and value judgments is underscored by the comments
of the federal trial court judge in Rouse v. Cameron' who
could not get the custodians of a petitioning inmate of a mental
institution to justify his confinement on any factual basis. The
court had repeatedly urged the witnesses for the institution to
explain specifically how the patient manifested the claimed
anti-social reaction. In evident exasperation at the recital of
vague statements and unsupported conclusions, the court said:
I am not going to keep anybody deprived of his liberty
on adjectives and generalities, it has got to be verbs and
nouns, something that a person does or says that differentiates him from normal people and makes him dangerous. .

.

. Liberty is too precious to leave it merely with the

151. The necessity of court review in the area of compelled organic therapy is
suggested by Shapiro, supra note 3, at 320-24. We go further and suggest that there
be no psychosurgery or convulsive therapy without prior judicial approval. The proceeding would be comparable to the acceptance of guilty pleas by criminal courts
pursuant to the guidelines for waiver. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
Knowledge and volition are inherent elements of the waiver guidelines, thus providing
a useful procedural model for determining voluntary, informed consent to utilization
of organic procedures.
152. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
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opinions of psychiatrists. . . . [Mlatters like these are, in
the ultimate analysis, for the court to determine.'53

Rouse involved confinement, but in the context of determining whether informed consent to organic procedures which
seek to alter mentation is present, the demand for findings
based upon ascertainable facts is equally essential. It is thus
imperative that the analysis of informed consent eschew such
value judgments and considerations of status as are incorporated in the notions of competence and capacity.
Legislation implementing the concerns we voice in this
article is needed to protect the fundamental rights of the prospective subjects of organic procedures designed to alter mentation or behavior, and to shield the professionals performing
the procedures from possible liability incurred in the performance of non-consensual or involuntary administration of such
organic procedures. Such legislation must require that the
treatment candidate be provided adequate information upon
which to base an informed choice and must insure that the
choice under all the circumstances is clearly voluntary. We
would suggest this language:
Section (1): The following information must be directly
communicated to the patient with a minimum of medical
jargon:
(a) That the person has the right to refuse the proposed
procedure and to revoke consent, orally or in writing, at
any time prior to, or in the course of, the procedures;
(b) A description of the procedure;
(c) The possible benefits of the procedure;
(d) The material risks and adverse effects of the procedure, and the extent to which these risks and effects may
be irreversible, taking into consideration the person's present physical condition, past and present illnesses, possible
pregnancy, use of other drugs, previous reaction to the
proposed procedure, and any other circumstances that a
reasonably prudent physician would take into account;
(e) The degree of uncertainty of the benefits and hazards
associated with the procedure;
(f) That there exists a diversity of medical opinion as to
the efficacy and the effects of the proposed procedure;
(g) In the case of psychosurgical and convulsive proce153. Rouse v. Cameron, transcript of proceedings (D.C. September 13, 1965), as
quoted in J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 603, 604 (1967).
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dures, the likelihood that the procedure will impair the
memory of the person consenting to the procedure;
(h) In the case of psychosurgical and convulsive procedures, that consent shall be for a specified number of procedures over a specified period of time, not to exceed 30
days. Additional procedures in number or time shall require written informed consent;
(i) That the person may take legal action against the
treating physician if his or her rights as defined in these
sections are violated;
(j) That the person waives all rights of action against the
treating physician for any acts reasonably performed in
accordance with the person's express consent.
The bill should define informed consent in terms of
knowledge and volition only, eliminating value laden and theoretical competency considerations:
Section (2) Definition, Informed Consent:
(a) An informed consent is one which is knowingly made,
without duress or coercion, and clearly and explicitly manifested in writing by the person to receive the procedure;
(b) No organic procedure may be administered to any
person in the absence of his or her informed consent,
provided that a physician, spouse, relative or guardian
may petition a court of competent jurisdiction for an order
to impose convulsive procedures where evidence is presented, and specific findings of fact made, that a clear and
imminent danger of immediate fatality exists, that convulsive procedures would prevent loss of life, and that no less
drastic measures would avert fatality.
(c) In a proceeding brought pursuant to section 2(b), the
necessity to impose convulsive procedures shall be proven
by the petitioning party beyond a reasonable doubt.
This legislative proposal and the arguments advanced in
this article are not intended, and will not function, to interfere
unduly with the contractual doctor-patient relationship, nor
with the rights of any individual to pursue a course of action
he or she feels to be in his or her best interest. Such interventions by the state into the private lives of individual citizens
are not legitimate. However, given the fundamental nature of
the interests involved, and the present attitudes of some members of the psychiatric community regarding non-consensual
but "needed" treatment, such legislation is necessary to insure
that organic procedures are administered strictly on a
consensual-contractual basis.

